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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A substantial body of experimental evidence suggests that adult
humans are highly sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of events.
In the verbal learning paradigm that has most often been used to evaluate
the abilities of persons to accurately estimate frequencies of presented
target items, correlations between actual and estimated frequencies of
occurrence have typically been in the high .80's (Zechmeister & Nyberg,
1982).

Having proposed the existence of two contrasting sets of cognitive

processes, automatic and effortful (or controlled) processes, Hasher
and Zacks (1979) proposed further that the ability to encode frequency
information should be viewed as the result of an automatic process.
Automatic processes are assumed to result in invariance of performance
under different conditions of learning, are assumed not to be influenced
by usually potent subject variables such as age, level of arousal,
previous trials at a task, or educational level (Hasher & Zacks, 1984).
Memory of frequency of occurrence has typically been investigated
under the relatively controlled conditions of the psychology laboratory;
thus, memory for frequency has typically included studies that have used
simple, verbal material and relatively brief presentation times for target
items.

A few laboratory experiments have used stimuli other than neutral

words or nonsense syllables, e.g., pictures of common objects {Hintzman

& Rogers, 1973), emotionally charged verbal material {Curt, 1982), self-

reference statements (Rodgers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), and sex role
appropriate behaviors (Perry & Bussey, 1979).

The relationship between

measures of frequency encoding and several subject variables also has
been investigated, under controlled laboratory conditions.

These

have included age (Hasher & Zacks, 1979), learning ability (Goldstein,
Hasher & Stein, 1983), depression (Curt, 1982), and learning set (Hasher

& Zacks, 1979).

Several types of frequency judgments have been used as

dependent variables.

These have included absolute frequency, relative

frequency, and category frequency measures.

However, the use of the

psychology laboratory, and the choice of procedures and stimulus materials
used in investigating frequency encoding, make it difficult to generalize
about memory for frequency of occurrence to naturalistic settings.
The present study investigates memory for frequency of occurrence
in the context of a larger study, designed to explore life situations and
moods encountered by persons treated for substance abuse.

The measures

of frequency encoding were obtained during the first 90 days after
discharge from an inpatient treatment facility.

The primary goal of

the present study was to determine if the high correlation observed in
the laboratory between actual frequency of occurrence and estimates of
frequency of occurrence could be observed in the more life-like situation
experienced by recovering substance abusers.

The subjects' self-reports

of moods and experiences were the stimuli for which frequency judgments
were made.

The present study also addressed the question of whether

substance abuse, a variable known to influence learning and memory in
other contexts, affects accuracy of frequency estimates.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Approaches to Judgments of Frequency of Occurrence
Limits in attentional capacity have been a central focus in models
of cognitive functioning for some time (Broadbent, 1958; Deutsch &
Deutsch, 1963; Keele, 1973; Treisman, 1960).

Theorists originally

proposed that these limits were most important at one particular stage of
processing; however, more recently, Kahneman (1973) emphasized the
allocation of attentional requirements to various functions at several
different stages of processing.

Kahneman proposed that attentional

capacity has the following characteristics:
is limited;

(a) attentional capacity

(b) individual differences and intra-individual variations

in attentional capacity exist; (c) mental operations differ in the
amount of attentional capacity that they require, with early processes
such as sensory analysis requiring less attention than operations
closer to the response end of the system; (d) variable capacity of
attention interacts with encoding demands to influence performance on
cognitive tasks.
Building on this view of attentional requirements, Posner and
Snyder (1974; 1979), Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and, more recently,
Hasher and Zacks (1979; 1984) proposed that, given large amounts of
practice, some complex operations (without regard to the stage of
processing where they may occur) become "automatic."

Automatic processes

presumably occur with only a minimal allocation of attentional capacity,
3

thus leaving more capacity in the system to be allocated to less routine
or novel functions.

These "non-automatic" processes are described as

effortful or controlled, and include such processes as retrieval
strategies, mnemonics, and elaborative rehearsal.

Effortful processes

are described as having characteristics opposite to those of automatic
processes, with all cognitive processes falling on a continuum between
the extremes of fully automatic and fully effortful processes.

This

review will focus on some of the more salient, and controversial
characteristics that have been suggested for automatic processes.
Effortful processes are discussed mainly to clarify these characteristics,
or to place them in the broader context of memory processes.
The criteria by which a process is characterized as being automatic
differ among the theorists cited above.

Posner and Snyder (1975) define

automatic processes as those that meet the following four criteria:
(a) they occur with minimal attention;
other, ongoing processing;

(b) they do not interfere with

(c) they do not result in the storage of

new information in long-term memory (LTM); and

(d) they develop only

after large amounts of practice.
Hasher and Zacks (1979) divide automatic processes according to
their sources (either learned or hereditary) and consider the last two
criteria posited by Posner and Snyder as applying only to learned
automatic processes; that is, those acquired by repeated practice.
Flavel (1977) proposed that automatic memory processes exist that do not
depend on practice, but are inherited, or "wired" into the organism,
comparable to Seligman' s ( 1970) "preparedness" concept (e.g., as suggested
by one trial taste aversion learning).

Hasher and Zacks, like Flavel,
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consider encoding of space, and frequency of occurrence attributes as
automatic proceses stemming from innate, pre-wired capacities.
Although always conceptualizing automatic and effortful
processes on a continuuum, Hasher and Zacks have identified criteria
for evaluating their model that draw clear divisions between effortful
and automatic processes in five contexts (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).

The

five areas and the criteria resulting from predicted differential
effects on learning of effortful processes versus those of automatic
processes are as follows:

(a) intentional versus incidental learning

conditions (i.e., automatic processes should not be influenced by
variations in intentional or incidental learning conditions, while
effortful processing should be affected by subjects' intent to learn);
(b) instructions and practice (i.e., instructional set or number of
previous trials should not influence automatic processes, while
effortful processes should be facilitated by both);

(c) developmental

trends (i.e., after a basic maturational level has been met no
differences should occur between young and old in automatic processing,
while effortful processing should first increase in efficiency and then
gradually decline across the lifespan);

(d) interference among

operations (i.e., automatic processes will allow other non-automatic
processes to proceed simultaneously without disruption, while effortful
processes compete for limited attentional capacity); and

(e) states

altering attentional capacity (i.e., automatic processes, in contrast
to effortful processes, should function without decrement under
different levels of arousal, states of depression or elation, or
changes in capacity due to aging).

6

Hasher and Zacks used these five criteria to contrast four
automatic processes (frequency sensitivity, spatial location encoding,
temporal information encoding, activiation of word meaning) with four
effortal processes (facilitation of memory via imagery, mnemonics or
elaborative devises, clustering and rehearsal).

Regarding sensitivity

to frequency of occurrence, studies were cited demonstrating that
there was no effect on frequency judgment accuracy of incidental
verus intentional learning conditions, practice, instructional set,
age, and level of arousal or depression, and that there was little
impact of individual differences on the ability to accurately estimate
frequency of occurrence (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).

Several of these

studies will be reviewed because of their central relevance to the
present study.
Frequency judgments made by children from grades 2, 4, and 6 have
been shown to be equally accurate to those made by college students, even
when the college students are informed in advance that a frequency test
will be given (Hasher & Chromiak, 1975).

This developmental invariance

in frequency sensitivity extends to late adulthood (Attig & Hasher, 1980;
Kausler & Puckett, 1980).

Students with significantly different SAT

scores who do show marked differences on a memory recall test (effortful
process) have been demonstrated to show no significant difference in
memory for frequency of occurrence for the same items used in the recall
test situation (Zacks, Hasher, Alba, Sandft, & Rose, 1984).

Frequency

processing of learning disabled children has been demonstrated to be
equally accurate as that of children who are proficient learners
(Goldstein, Hasher & Stein, 1983).

A final example of a variable having
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an unexpected lack of effect is that of depression, a variable often
resulting in impairment of cognitive functions, but that has no impact
on frequency judgments (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).
Findings similar to those for frequency information processing
are cited for spatial encoding and temporal encoding, although these
did show develomental trends that Hasher and Zacks attributed to
task-related variables that require effortful processes.

More

recently, however, Hasher and Zacks reported results of an experiment
that did not support the notion that temporal order encoding was
completely automatic and the authors now subscribe to Tzeng's view that
allows for both automatic and non-automatic aspects of temporal
encoding (Tzeng & Cotton, 1980; Zacks, Hasher, Alba, Sandft, & Rose,
1984).

Regarding word meaning activation (an acquired automatic

process), they marshalled evidence from dichotic listening tasks to
show that this process occurs without awareness.

They also cited the

Stroop test literature as evidence that the interference effect of word
meaning on color naming cannot be inhibited and that this interference
effect continues from the early grade school years through old age,
thus demonstrating the automaticity of word meaning activation.
In contrast to the developmental invariance and absence of
effects of intention or learning set, and of arousal level on automatic
processing, effortful processing varies with numerous conditions
(Hasher & Zacks, 1981).

It has been demonstrated, for instance, that

reliance on imagery based memory strategies increases through the
elmentary school years, with effects of imagery on memory showing a clear
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developmental trend.

Mnemonic devices usually require instruction and

effort and the effects of such devices on memory depends on the level
of instruction, intention, and effort.

Clustering strategies can be

disrupted by high levels of arousal, the effects of rehearsal increase
over the life span until old age, and can be disrupted by depression.
In brief, Hasher and Zacks (1979) concluded that there was strong
support in the existing literature for their model of a continuum of
processes ranging from automatic to controlled or effortful, and for
"the existence of a small set of basic cognitive processes that encode
certain attributes of information directly into long-term memory
throughout the life span and in spite of any alterations in capacity
from stress" (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, p. 382).

This position, the reader

may remember, differs from Posner and Synder•s position that automatic
processes have no direct impact on LTM.
If Hasher and Zacks are correct and automatic processes, including
automatic encoding of frequency information, exist that are capable of
adding new information to LTM, then the outputs of these processes can
influence decisions that a person makes in spite of the fact that the
data are collected incidentally, that is without conscious awareness.
For example, Hasher, Goldstein, and Toppino (1977) found that mere
frequency of occurrence plays a role in subjects' decisions about the
truth or validity of plausible statements, such as "rice is grown in
Flordia" or "the population of Greenland is 40 ,000."

The more frequently

a person heard these statements the more he/she felt them to be true.
The experimenters concluded that subjects used automatically encoded

9

frequency information in making judgments of the probable truth of a
statement.

Such information would be "data driven," the result of

processes that function independently of the intentions, interests, and
higher abilities of the person receiving the information.

These memory

processes would function in a sharply different way than the memory
operations involving imagery, elaboration, and retrieval plans (all
effortful process) but, nevertheless, still have a major impact of the
subject's final response.
The utility of automatic processs is obvious, as they ensure
that important information will be processed and later available to
consciousness.

They also guarantee that some fundamental aspects of

the flow of events are stored, so that the organism can both orient
itself in the environment, and retain the information required to learn
from experience while, at the same time, leaving maximal attentional
resources available for allocation to complex mental processes and
novel events or responses (Hasher & Zacks, 1984).

Automatically

encoded frequency, spatial, and temporal information also may serve an
enabling role in retrieval of information, as in reconstructive memory
processes.

An example might be knowing that a target word was on a

list that had been seen twice rather than on a list that had been
presented eight times.

Here, frequency information might serve as a

retrieval cue for the targeted stimulus (Posnansky, 1978; Underwood,
1971).
As suggested earlier, if this model is correct it has important
implications for understanding other aspects of cognition (Hasher & Zacks,
1984).

For instance, decision making appears to be based on affective
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responses, and subjective probabilities that are shaped by rate of
occurrence information (Estes, 1976; Zajonc, 1968).

Developmental

trends in such areas as category formation, word perception, and even
sex role typing of behaviors could be examined for influences from
frequency-based information.

Finally, other cognitive processes such

as those found in person perception (use of implicit trait schemata,
prototype assignment, and person memory) could be conceptualized as a
combination of specific automatic and effortful processes that operate
along similar lines as those outlined for more basic processes (Cantor

& Mishel, 1979).
Much of the controversy surrounding the concept of automatic
processing in memory involves the encoding of frequency information
(e.g., Fisk & Schneider, 1984).

Three methods have been used to study

sensitivity for frequency of occurrence information:

(a) the absolute

judgment method, wherein subjects estimate the specific frequency that
an item occurred in the presentation series;

(b) the forced-choice or

frequency discrimination method, wherein subjects are asked to identify
the member of a set of stimuli that has occurred most frequently; and
(c) the frequency ranking method, wherein a set of stimuli are rank
ordered by the subject according to rate of occurrence.
the above methods is most commonly used.

The first of

For example, subjects are

often merely presented with a series of simple stimuli (words, pictures,
etc.), some of which are repeated, and then asked to estimate the
frequency of occurrence of each item.

Instructions may be varied

between groups to create various experimental conditions.

For

instance, some subjects may be asked to memorize the stimuli for a
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recall test, or to look for a particular class of stimuli among
distractor fillers, or to try to keep track of frequencies of a
particular target stimulus among distractors.

The typical findings of

such experiments are that subjects make relatively accurate judgments
across instruction conditions, with correlations of actual to estimated
frequencies being as high as .88 (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982).
Subjects are sensitive to differences in frequency of internal
as well as external events (imagining the stimulus versus actual
presentation of the stimulus) and can accurately discriminate frequency
of these types of experiences (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).

Moreover,

subjects can be highly sensitive to slight alterations in situational
designation of the occurrence, or the unit of occurrence, for example,
being able to rate accurately the frequency of occurrence of verbatim
sentences imbedded in a context that includes sentences differing only
in gist (Gude & Zechmeister, 1975).
That frequency judgment accuracy is resilient to changes in
subject variables and learning conditions which routinely produce major
differences in other psychological and cognitive tasks, is an important
empirical finding that supports the claim for automaticity of encoding
of frequency information.

As reviewed earlier, studies have

demonstrated with high consistency that frequency of occurrence
judgments are equally accurate in persons of different age groups,
various levels of academic ability, differing levels of prior practice
at making such judgments; and that this consistency is also seen within
the same subject in conditions that would compromise other cognitive
abilities.

Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that an
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automatic system for encoding occurrence rate information that has an
impact on LTM does exist, and that the differences among and within
individuals seen in most cognitive processes do not apply to this
system.
Clearly, Hasher and Zacks have developed a model with impressive
empirical support; however, recent studies have made this empirical
base seem less secure.

For instance, one study (Fisk & Schneider,

1984) investigating automatic categorization of words showed that
subjects could accurately categorize words and show little recognition
for categorized words on a later test, and have no demonstrable
retention of frequency information for the correctly categorized words.
These results tend to contradict Hasher and Zacks' contention that
frequency information is automatically encoded into LTM.

Another

recent set of experiments points to the limitations of Hasher and
Zack's model in differentiating between mechanisms of encoding that may
be automatic and retrieval mechanisms that involve intention and
awareness.

These effortful mechanisms must be active prior to making

even automatically processed information available to the subject.

If

this is the case, no pure test of the automaticity of memory processes
would be possible, since their effects would always be linked to those
of effortful processes such as retrieval (Greene, 1984).

Greene (1984)

also found interference in word recall in a group of subjects under
intentional learning conditions. No frequency information encoding was
demonstrated by an incidental learning group in the same experiment,
thus placing two of Hasher and Zacks' criteria in doubt in regard to
the automaticity of encoding of frequency information.

Also, as
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mentioned above, the full automaticity of temporal encoding has been
recently disconfirmed (Zacks, et al, 1984).
An alternative view of memory for frequency of occurrence has
been developed by Tvesky and Kahneman (1978).

They stress the errors

in frequency estimation that derive from the use of cognitive heuristics.
One such heuristic is related to the availability of instances of an
event.

The availability heuristic is a cognitive process:
for estimating the numerosity of a class, the likelihood of
an event, or the frequency of co-occurrences, by the ease with
which the relevant mental operations of retrieval, construction,
or association can be performed (Tvesky & Kahneman, 1978, p.
1128).

This heuristic is operative at the retrieval stage of information
processing, as compared to automatic processing theory's emphasis on
the prior stage of information encoding.
That the use of such a heuristic is often appropriate is based
on the fact that, other things being equal, the instances of large
classes of events are more available to memory than are the instances
of smaller classes of events.

Biases, however, are introduced by factors

which affect availability differently within classes.
Kahneman (1978) identify four availability biases:
the retrievability of instances;

Tvesky and

(a) biases due to

(b) biases due to the effectiveness of

a search set; (c) biases of imaginability; and

(d) illusory correlations,

where the strength of the association between members of a stimulus pair
influences the judgment of the frequency that the pair was presented.
An example of this bias was noted by Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969).
They showed that the pair long-tiger was rated as having a higher
occurrence than lion-egg despite the fact that both pairs were actually
presented on an identical number of trials.
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Describing the first of these four biases, retrievability, in
more detail will be useful here, since it bears significantly on
self-relevancy of information, an aspect of the stimuli to be used in
the present study. An experiment by Tvesky and Kahneman (1973) serves
as a good example of an experimental variable independent of actual
frequency, having significant impact on frequency estimates.

In this

experiment, familiarity was shown to significantly affect estimates of
frequency of category occurrence.

Half of the lists presented to

subjects contained 19 names of famous females and 20 names of less
famous males, while the remaining lists contained 19 names of famous
males and 20 names of less famous females.

Among the 90 subjects who

estimated frequency of men and women in the presented lists,
significantly more (80 subjects) mistakenly judged the more fame-laden
category to be the more frequently presented gender.

Familiarity of

the name stimuli apparently affected the availability of recallable
instances of a given gender's occurrence on the list, a finding that
appears to be contrary to Hasher and Zacks' automatic model of
frequency processing.
Theoretical formulations and experiments like those of Tvesky
and Kahneman have special relevance for the present study since it is
possible that the estimates obtained from the subjects of events relevant
to themselves may reflect biases related to demand characteristics,
cognitive representation of self, salience of items to the subject, or
some other factors not related to frequency of occurrence information.
If this is the case, any differences observed between the experimental
and control groups on the present study would have to be interpreted
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in a different light, for example, by including viewpoints from a
personality and cognitive-set perspective.

At the very least,

experimental approaches like those of Tvesky and Kahneman, Fisk and
Schenider, and others, indicate that the controversy over the impact of
the automatic processing theory of frequency of occurrence information
and its relation to LTM, learning conditions, and subject variables is
bound to continue.
Cognitive Impairment in Alcoholics
A recent review of the literature on cognitive impairment in
alcoholics and other substances abusers notes that:
To profit from psychological treatment, an individual must be
capable of receiving new information, integrating it with
existing stores, and then, hopefully, changing some aspect of
his or her behavior. In recent years psychologists have
accumulated more and more evidence that alcoholics are deficient
in their cognitive processing (Goldman, 1983, p. 1045).
Goldman raises the issue of how treatment might need to be modified
when such impairment is taken into consideration.

Although consistent

patterns on intelligence tests are not found by most researchers
(Kleinknecht & Goldstein, 1972), attention to other subject variables
in connection with alcohol abuse has shown a consistent pattern on the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale:

the maintenance of performance on

overall I. Q. and on the "hold" verbal subtests, accompanied by clear
decline in functioning on the Block Design, Digit Symbol, and Object
Assembly subtests (Parsons & Farr, 1981).

These variables include age,

drinking history, SES, and poly-drug use, among others.

On sophisticated

neuropsychological batteries, cognitive impairment has been even more
consistently demonstrated (Goldman, 1983).

For example, alcoholics

score in the impaired range on both the Tactual Perception Test (visuo-
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on both the Tactual Perception Test (visuo-spatial, tactual abilities,
and spatial memory) and the Speech Sounds Perception Test, a test of
auditory ability (Butters & Cermak, 1980).
In his review, Goldman traces three major themes emerging in the
alcoholism-cognitive impairment literature.

The first is a "striking

parallel" between neuropsychological functioning of alcoholics and the
neuropsychological functioning of elderly non-alcoholics.

One aspect

of this emergent theme is the apparent resistance to impairment of
younger alcoholics, pointing to a "critical age" beyond which alcohol
abuse is accompanied by the type of neuropsychological performance that
would be more typical of chronologically older persons.

This implies a

kind of premature aging process caused by alcohol abuse that results in
subtle brain damage that accelerates, or increases in its effect, after
a certain age is reached (Freund, 1982; Grant, Adams, & Reed, 1980).
Goldman's second theme is that there is a continuity of memory
dysfunctions between Korsakoff syndrome patients and alcoholics without
the full-blown syndrome (Butters & Cermak, 1980; Oscar-Berman, 1980).
The finding of an apparent progression of dysfunction from normals
through Korsakoff patients, with deficits increasing with increasing
alcohol consumption, has been interpreted by some workers as an effect
resulting from the relationship among drinking dose per episode, age of
drinker, and memory function.

This view posits that the progression of

dysfunction often reported in the literature does not rest on any
underlying neuropathological substrate but on the intercorrelations
among these ubiquitous variables, although some studies have not
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confirmed these confounding relationships (Macvane, Butter, Mongtomery,

& Farber, 1982).
The third emergent theme outlined by Goldman is related to
localization of brain damage in alcoholics.

Hypotheses have been

advanced emphasizing damage to the right cerebreal hemisphere (Jones &
Parsons, 1972), the frontal-limbic diencephalic system (Tarter, 1975),
or leas localized damage that ia instead more diffuse (Wilkinson &
Carlen, 1981).
Two studies reported by Brandt and aaaociatea exemplify each of
these themes (Brandt, Butters, Ryan & Bayog, 1983).

Using a large number

of alcoholic subjects divided into younger and older alcoholics,
significant deficits in performance were demonstrated on verbal and nonverbal short-term memory (STM) taaka when compared to non-alcoholic
controls matched for age and education.

Detoxified alcoholics were found

to be severely impaired on the Symbol-Digit Paired-Associate Learning
Test and on the Embedded Figures Test.

This study, however, did not

demonstrate any sparing of younger alcholics from these cognitive losses,
a phenomenon often reported in the literature.
by Brandt et al. investigated recoverability.

The second study reported
With growing consistency,

recoverability of neuropsychological functioning during periods of
alcohol abstinence and late in a recovery period has been demonstrated
(Claiborn & Greene, 1981; Kish, Hagen, Woody & Harvey, 1980).

With age,

duration of alcohol abuse, and education as covariates, Brandt et al.
found that prolonged abstinence led to better recoverability of function
as measured by a battery of neuropsychological tests than either short-
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term or long-term abstinence.

On a test of verbal STM, recoverability

appeared to be complete in the prolonged abstinence group.

Intermediate

recovery on the same task was displayed by the long-term and short-term
groups, which were not statistically different from each other.

No

recoverability was found for any of the groups on the Symbol-Digit
Paired-Associate Learning Test or on the Embedded Figures Test.

The

authors noted that recoverability is not an all-or-none phenomenon.
STM seemed to be almost completely recoverable, while LTM and tasks
that involved encoding strategies and the ability to form new
associations may be permanently impaired by prolonged alcohol abuse.
This finding was interpreted by Brandt et al. in the light of the
different areas of the brain that might be responsible for STM and LTM
processes (cortical versus sub-cortical structures, respectively).
This brief review clearly indicates a consensus that some
neuropathological damage exists in alcoholics that helps to account for
their usually poorer performance on a wide range of neuropsychological
tasks, including those involving memory functions. If memory for
frequency of occurrences does not follow Hasher and Zacks' model but,
instead, follows the same kind of continuum of performance cited by
Goldman (1983), this is reasonable to subject that alcoholics would show
significantly lower frequency judgment performance on this kind of task
than would non-alcoholics.

The result would suggest that differences

in frequency judgment performance are sensitive to decreases in cognitive
capacity related to chemically induced brain dysfunction.

CHAPTER III
THE PRESENT STUDY
The Context Study
The present study will investigate frequency of occurrence
phenomena in the context of a larger study designed to explore life
situations and mood states encountered by persons during the first 90
days after discharge from an inpatient substance abuse treatment
facility.

Investigating frequency of occurrence information in this

context will involve fitting the typical experimental paradigm for such
studies to the subjects, stimuli, and larger time intervals required by
the field conditions of the larger study.

Thus, it will be necessary

to first describe the larger experimental context in which frequency of
occurrence phenomena will be investigated.
The larger study on which the present experiment builds was begun
in November 1983, at Lutheran Center for Substance Abuse in Park Ridge,
Illinois.

This center is a private treatment facility associated with

Lutheran General Hospital, located in the same northwest Chicago suburb.
The study's purpose was to investigate patterns of recovery in treated
alcholics by use of intensive self-report measures and structured
interviews.

In order to obtain a random sample of the recovering

person's moods and experiences, the study utilized long-range pagers
that were triggered randomly four times per day between the hours of
8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., seven days per week.

Subjects who were

scheduled to be "on the beeper" for a given period were to complete a
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Daily Activity Report each time they were paged.

This report is a

self-report measure of mood states, salient thoughts and experiences,
situational confidence of abstinence, substance use since the last
beep, A.A. and other self-help group activities since the last beep,
and responses toward individuals the subject might be relating to at
the time of the beep (Appendix A).

In addition to these four, daily

self-generated "snap-shots" of the subject's ongoing experience, each
subject completed an End of the Day Report that summarized his/her
perceptions of the entire day.
Clinical subjects for this study were volunteers recruited from
the inpatient population who met two criteria:

(a) geographic ease

of access to the center for periodic interviews and exchanges of
experimental materials, and

(b) the absence of any clinical judgment

on the part of the treatment team that participation would be disruptive
of the potential subject's adjustment after discharge.

Potential

subjects excluded from recruitment due to the second criteria were
extremely rare.

Subjects were introduced to the experiment's purpose

and methods in an information meeting, where the voluntary nature of
their participation, confidentiality of subject information, and the
independence of the study from the facilities treatment activities
were emphasized.

Participating subjects received a total of $50 for

transportation and other expenses related to their participation.

This

involved two disbursements, one of $20 at discharge and a second of $30
at the investigator's receipt of all experimental materials at the
completion of the 90-day participation.

A community sample was
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recruited from the surrounding residential area to serve as a nontreatment control group.

These subjects received $25 at the end of

their two-week participation.

An attempt was made to obtain a

reasonably representative sample across the age groups and SES groups
for the comunity sample, in order to reflect the full range of
demographic factors in the population typically served by the center.
All subjects participated under a signed consent and all experimental
procedures were reviewed and approved by the hospital's Human Subjects
Committee.
The clinical subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
groups.

Subjects in Group I carried the pager each day for the entire

90 days.

Subjects in Group II followed the same protocol of filling

out self-reports when paged, but carried pagers on a two weeks "on, 11
two weeks "off" schedule.

Subjects in Group III served as a clinical

control group and did not carry a pager at any time.

In addition to

day-to-day self-reports, each group had an assigned contact schedule of
brief biweekly, on-site interviews, and biweekly telephone contacts
conducted by a trained, supervised research assistant.
Subjects in Groups I and II had interviews and telephone contacts
on a regular weekly rotating basis.

Subjects in Group III were assigned

only one telephone contact each month.

The purpose of both of these

contacts was to correct any practical difficulties related to the study
(pager malfunctions, lost activity workbooks, etc.) and to record any
signficant perception or experiences volunteered by the subjects that
were related to their participation in the study, or to their recovery
adjustment.

Contacts were made in an open-ended, informal way via the
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telephone and pursued more extensively in face-to-face interviews,
although an attempt was made to avoid unnecessary probing.

Subjects in

Groups I and II also completed semi-weekly self-report measures,
exchanged materials and arranged their next appointments during each
biweekly visit to the facility.

All subjects received a more extensive

and structured interview at the end of their participation in the
experiment.

Several standard psychological measures were administered

at this time as repeated measures from a larger set of inventories and
tests administered before their discharge from treatment.
Having briefly outlined the larger study from which this
experiment draws its subjects and stimulus materials, it may be
apparent as to how this context allows for the study of memory for
frequency of occurrence.

A major criterion in choosing stimulus

materials for the present study was that they be amenable to objective
scoring frequency.

The subject's own self-generated ratings on the

Daily Activities Reports meet this criterion and were considered
stimuli for which frequency of occurrence estimates may be obtained.
These estimates could then be compared to the subject's actual use of
the response range for each item.

For example, the Alert-Drowsy bipolar

adjective item on the Daily Activity Report can be divided into three
meaningful response ranges:
(c) some to very drowsy.

(a) very, to some alert;

(b) neither; and

Each subject's response to this item over two

weeks or 90 days must fall into one of these response categories.
Subjects can be asked to estimate the relative use of each category in
terms of percentages, with 100% being the total number of times they
responded to this item over the period of participation in question.
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Actual relative frequency can be computed by simply tallying the
responses as they occur in the subject's record and computing the
actual relative frequencies for each category in percentages.

A

measure of accuracy or inaccuracy can then be obtained, and the several
questions of interest to the typical study of frequency of occurrence
studies can be asked of the data.

Are the theoretically predicted

correlations between actual and estimated relative frequencies observed?
Does the degree of accuracy of estimates vary with subject status on
variables known to affect other memory processes, such as abuse (present
or absent), phase or recovery (late or early)?

More generally, are the

data consistent with the prevailing models of frequency of occurrence
phenomena or, if inconsistent, on what basis can this inconsistency be
explained?

The present study, then, is partly exploratory in nature,

attempting to explore well established experimental findings with novel
data that may yield implications for clinical understanding and
treatment issues, as well as providing evidence to support basic
theoretical formulations regarding memory and learning.
The Present Study
Although frequency judgments were collected for several two-week
intervals and for the entire 90 days of participation for subjects in
both clinical groups, the present study is limited to an investigation
of frequency judgments obtained at the first two-week evaluation, and
can be seen as a preliminary to a repeated measures design or an
investigation of judgments involving a larger time interval.
The exploratory nature of the present study calls for an openended approach to the problems presented by the several theoretical
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perspectives that are relevant to frequency judgments and the effects
of alcoholism on memory function.

It will be possible to view the

resulting data within the context of automatic processing theory and
availability heuristics by emphasizing the frequency judgment aspect of
the study.

The emphasis of the grouping variables would make hypotheses

grounded in a neuropsychological deficit view of alcoholism relevant,
and would lead to the prediction that alcoholics will show cognitive
impairment on frequency judgments as has been the case on some other
measures of cognitive functioning.

The following hypotheses can be

tested, given the data to be generated from this study.

Each is listed

under the appropriate theoretical viewpoint that has lead to its
generation.
Automatic Processing Theory Hypotheses
1.

Relative frequency judgments and actual relative frequency of

occurrence will be highly correlated.
2.

Actual frequency of occurrence will produce the only

significant effect on estimates (i.e., subject variables, item salience,
item evaluative direction, etc., will not produce significant main
effects or interaction effects on accuracy measures).
Cognitive Impairment Hypotheses

3.

The recovery group will have significantly lower accuracy

scores than the control group.
4.

Recovery group subjects will perform more poorly than controls

on judgments involving complex category judgments since the latter may
be more sensitive to subtle deficits.

This hypothesis refers to the

different category judgments requested from subjects.

The first two
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questions required that the subject estimate the occurrence of events
within spatial categories (i.e., extreme right or extreme left), while
the second two questions require that the subject make a more complex
judgment of the occurrence of events within a broader range involving
evaluative categories (i.e., positive or negative affect). This second
task may prove to be more sensitive to subtle cognitive deficit than
the first task, which on inspection appears to demand a more primitive
memory process.
Availability of Heuristic Hypotheses
5.

Items that are rated as intuitively more salient to

alcoholics in recovery will produce underestimation and overestimated
effects greater than those items not judged to be salient, or abuserrelevant items.

Items can be judged as abuser-relevant by means of a

set of independent raters, preferably persons who themselves are
recovering abusers.

These effects would be predicted from the strong

associations related to the self-relevancy of the salient items,
causing overestimation, and to the psychodynamic, defensive or
repressive reaction to other salient items, resulting in
underestimation.

CHAPTER IV
METHOD
Subjects
The recovery group consisted of 22 persons of both genders.
community sample also included 22 persons of both genders.

The

Treatment

subjects were randomly selection Group I and Group II subjects in the
context study.

Since Group III subjects never generated the self-report

stimuli required for the memory task, they were not included in the
present study.

All community sample subjects who completed the required

protocol were included in the present study.
Stimuli
The stimuli for which judgments were made were the subjects' own
self-ratings of their thoughts and feelings over the two-week period
between discharge and evaluation.

The actual frequency of occurrence

of these self-generated stimuli depended ideally on several factors:
subject compliance to the experimental protocol, the subjects' actual
mood states and experiences, their ability to report them, and the
demand characteristics of self-report situations such as the one the
context study required.
The actual stimuli are discrete markings on continuously scaled
lines, indicating extremes from either end of a bipolar adjective or
between high and low poles on items measuring preoccupation with eating,
preoccupation with using, confidence of abstinence, and degree of sharing
with others (see Appendix A).
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Subject Estimates
Several dependent measures were developed from subject estimates.
Estimates were collected by means of a paper and pencil instrument titled
"Memory Task Moment-to-Moment Beep" (Figure 1).
this sheet is labeled

The first section of

"General Questions" and consists of four questions

involving overall frequency judgments of all ratings over a given period.
The first two of these questions refer to the occurrence of only the
extreme right or left markings.

The second two questions refer to the

evaluative direction of the markings, either desirable or undesirable.
With proud, for example, being toward the positive evaluative direction
and on the right-hand side of the response form; while ashamed, the other
pole of this item, being toward the negative direction and on the lefthand side of the form.
predetermined
direction.

The items were randomly placed and follow no

right-hand orientation for positive or negative evaluative

The neither category is considered to be neither positive

nor negative in evaluation, and may simply indicate that the respondent
did not consider the item relevant at the time of response.
The second section entitled "Mood Questions" is formatted similarly
to the Daily Activity Report used by the subjects throughout their
participation, with the spatial arrangement, adjective poles, and order
of items being the same with the exception of several items being
completely eliminated, since they were not of experimental interest.
All judgments requested are relative frequency judgments expressed in
percentages.

These judgments are, in fact, category judgments since a

range of markings must be considered as a unit to make the required
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Figure 1.

Memory Task Moment-to-Moment Beep
Subject ID I

----------

Date:
Check one:

[] Total Period

[] First 2 Weeks

[]Last 2 Weeks

General Questions:
1.

What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book
_ _%
on the EXTREME RIGHT of the mood rating form?

2.

What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book
_ _%
on the EXTREME LEFT of the mood rating form?

3.

What percentage of the time did you mark the POSITIVE items on
the mood rating form?
_ _%

4.

What percentage of the time did you mark the NEGATIVE items on
the mood rating form?
_ _%
Percentage of Responses

Mood Questions
very
0

quite

quite
0

sad

_%

_%

cheerful

_%

_%

weak

_%
_%
_%

_%
_%
_%
_%
_%
_%

_%
_%
_%
_%

passive

_%
_%
_%

ashamed

irritable
strong
angry

tense

0

_%

_%
_%

confused

very

drowsy

happy

proud

some

_%

_%

lonely

neither

_%
_%

alert

active

some

0

_%
_%
_%

friendly
sociable
clear
relaxed

Percentage (%) of Responses
Not at all/Somewhat
How preoccupied were you with eating?
How preoccupied were you with drinking/
using?
How confident did you feel about your
ability to resist the urge to drink/
use?
Did you share your feelings with someone
close to you?

Quite/Verl

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%
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judgment.

The final section of the sheet consists of questions related

to preoccupations, confidence, and sharing of feelings.

Responses to

these items are considered dichotomous for purposes of this task, since
no "neither" category occurs.
Procedure
Subjects were adminisered the memory task at the end of their
first weeks of participation in the context study.

The tests were

given at the time of the biweekly or final on-site interviews.

The

task was administered by trained research assistants following written
instructions (Appendix B).

These instructions are designed to

highlight for the subject that he or she would be using memory rather
than some other strategy for producing their estimates.
given as much time as they wanted for the task.

Subjects were

Subjects who felt they

could not do the task as instructed were encouraged to attempt it, but
were excused from the task if they persisted.
Behavioral observations were made of the subject's order of
performing each item.

When subjects clearly did not understand the

task indicated, for example, by going beyond the 100% constraint on each
item, or by giving patently unrealistic estimates for the most extreme
marking categories, the experimenter pointed this out to the subject and
would again explain the task to the subject, but without modifying the
subject's responses.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Coding of Responses
Responses to 14 items from the subjects' Daily Activity Reports
(Appendix A) were recorded for purposes of the present study.

The

remaining items on the Daily Actvity Reports were dropped because they
were not of interest to the present study, either because they were not
codable for relative frequencies, or because their inclusion would have
made the memory task unreasonably time consuming for the subjects.
14 items of interest were of two kinds:

The

mood items and non-mood items.

The mood items will be described first, followed by a description of
the non-mood items.
The mood item consisted of 10 pairs of adjectives describing mood
states or states of arousal.

The 10 pairs of adjectives were:

alert-

drowsy, happy-sad, irritable-cheerful, strong-weak, angry-friendly,
active-passive, lonely-sociable, proud-ashamed, confused-clear, and
tense-relaxed. The adjective pairs were arranged on the Daily Activity
Report so that 5 of the 10 adjectives were a positive connotation (as
intuitively defined by the researchers) were on the left-hand side of
the form, while the other 5 were on the right-hand side, thus forcing
the adjectives with different connotations to be balanced for right-left
placement.

The 10 adjectives with a positive connotation were:

alert,

happy, cheerful, strong, friendly, active, sociable, proud, clear and
These adjective will hereafter be referred to collectively as positives.
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The 10 negative adjectives were: drowsy, sad, irritable, weak, angry,
passive, lonely, confused and tense.

These adjectives will hereafter

be referred to collectively as negatives.
Adjectives within a pair were separated on the Daily Activity
Report by seven scale markers.

This allowed the subjects to indicate a

mood state on any given item by checking the marker that indicated to
what extent (very, quite, some, neither) they were experiencing a given
mood (as described by an adjective) at the time of the beep.

The

response marker indicating that the subject experienced neither the
positive nor negative mood state described by an adjective pair was
located in the middle column of the Daily Activity Report mood section,
between the two defining adjective poles.

Responses on all 10 mood

items that reflected subjects' use of this middle marker will be
referred to as neithers when discussed collectively in the remaining
text.
Coding of the mood items involved assigning values to each
response marker depending on its right-left placement on the bipolar
scale.

From right to left responses were coded 6, 5, 4, O, 3, 2, 1.

This coding scheme was adopted so that means for mood states could be
calculated for certain analyses (for example, an analysis to determine
if the average intensity of a mood state was related to accuracy).
Subjects were allowed only one response per bipolar item.
Responses falling between two markers were assigned to the nearest
response category.

Responses that were exactly between categories were

assigned to the next higher category.

Cases when more than one

32

response was made to an item on a given beep, or to which no response
was made, were coded as missing.
The non-mood items of interest to the present study consisted of
four questions:

(1) How preoccupied were you with eating?

preoccupied were you with drinking/using?

(3) How confident did you feel

about your ability to resist the urge to drink/use?
your feelings with someone close to you?
will be referred to as non-mood items.

(2) How

(4) Did you share

Collectively, these questions
Individually, they will be

referred to (in order listed above) as preoccu. eat, preoccu. using,
confident-resist, and shared.
Responses to the non-mood items were made by the subject on a
pre-coded line on the Daily Activity Report form.

Markers on the line

were numbered from 0 to 9, moving from left to right, and indicated
responses to a given question from "not at all" to "very much. 11
coding scheme was maintained for data analysis.

This

The same conventions

used on the mood items for handling responses between markers and for
multiple responses to an item on a single beep were also used for
non-mood i terns.
Compliance
The research protocol called for each subject to be beeped four
times a day for two weeks.

For the purposes of the present study, this

meant that a perfect compliance to the protocol would result in 784
responses across items for each subject, or 56 responses to each
individual item over the 14-day period.

Compliance varied little from

item to item; subjects rarely completed only some of the items of
interest on the Daily Activity Report without completing others.
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Because of this consistency. the number of responses to the first mood
item, alert-drowsy, was used as an index of overall compliance.

The

control group responded to this item an average of 44.2 times with a
standard deviation of 12.8.

The recovery group responded to this item

an average of 47.8 times with a standard deviation of 11.8.

The control

group's average compliance was 79% of perfect compliance, while the
recovery group's average was 86% of the same protocol goal.

The

difference between the two groups on this measure of compliance was not
significant when tested with a two-tailed! test, 1 (44)

= .928.

Construction and Description of Relative Frequencies
Subjects' actual responses for the 14 days of participation were
tallied within ranges defined by the judgments required by the Memory
Task.

Percentages were then calculated for the number of actual

responses falling into each range from the total number of responses to
a given item.

This resulted in relative frequencies for each item,

expressed in percentages, corresponding to the ranges specified in the
Memory Task.
The means and standard deviations of the subjects' relative
frequencies for each group and for each item appear in Table 1.
Collectively, these relative frequencies of responses on the Daily
Activity Reports expressed in percentages will be referred to as
frequencies.

The term frequency will be used where context makes this

usage grammatically appropriate.
In investigating frequencies,
describing group differences.

~

tests were used as a way of

Since no hypotheses were entertained in
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Table 1
Mean Freguency by Item and by Group

Item

Group

Positives

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers
Alert/Drowsy
Happy/Sad
Irritable/Cheerful
Strong/Weak
Angry/Friendly
Active/Passive
Lonely/Sociable
Proud/Ashamed
Confused/Clear
Tense/ Relaxed

Controls

Recovery

M

SD

M

SD

69.7
64.3
41.0
49.6

23.0
20 .1
30.8
27.3
28.2
23.6
24.0
22.9
33.3
27 .8

79.4
63.8
55.2
59.3
49.4
57.2
58.4
52 .1
63.6
45.8

13.7
20.2

33.4
51.1
58.6
50.0
61.5
58.5

Controls

4.5
24.8
27.4
43.1
30.8
22.5
32.1
62.7
26.9
19. 1

5.2
18.3
21.5
32.4
23.4
27.7
25.1
31.4
31.5
19.9

23.5
18.6
26.9
18 .9
18.6
21.9
21.8
25.6

Recovery

3.0
18. 1
18.8
25.8
20.9
13.4
17.9
37.1
14.9
12.8

P Level

4.6
15.5
12.9
23.4
17 .5
13.7
18. 1
27 .5
13.9
19.0

P Level

*

•
**
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Table 1 - Continued
Mean Frequency by Test Item and by Group

Group

Item
Controls

Negatives

Angry
Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
Drowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

n

= 22

• p

**

p

7.4
10. 1

17.9
11.6

20.3
10.8

22.3
25.8
11.0
15.9
27.8

17. 1
20.2

3.9

Non-Mood Items

NOTE:

M
10.6
21.4

SD

9.2
15.5
17.3
5.7

Controls

< .01.

M
20.7
23.9
20.0
21.6
41.4
17.6
18. 1
19.0
27 .3
13.4

SD
14.8
15.5
20.6
15.9
21. 7
14. 1
16.9
13.4
18.5
12. 7

Recovery

M

SD

M

SD

5.7
2.6

6.5

7.4
5. 1
88.3

10.3
9.0
19.5
28.3

94.5
14.0

5.3
8.4
14.7

for all group means •

< .05.

Recovery

3.3

P Level

•
•

••

P Level

••
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the represent study for group differences on frequencies, the statistical
test is used descriptively, not in a hypothesis testing mode.

Because

of this descriptive use of statistics that are often used for hypothesis
testing, each use is described as either descriptive or hypothesis
testing as it appears in the text.
Descriptive comparisons between groups on frequencies resulted in
eight significant differences based on a two-tailed ! test, as reported
in Table 1.

The recovery group was significantly higher on frequencies

of angry, confused, tense, ashamed, and shared.

The control group had

significantly higher frequencies of lonely-sociable, proud-ashamed, and
strong-weak.

When considered from the point of view of evaluative

direction, significant differences between groups appeared on negatives
and neithers, but not on positives.

The recovery group had significantly

higher mean frequencies of responses on 4 of the 10 negative items.
For all of the 10 bipolar items, the control group had higher mean
frequencies than the recovery group for neithers, although the
differences were significant only in the cases of strong-weak, lonelysociabl e, and proud-ashamed.

Of the four non-mood items, only share

showed a significant difference, such that the recovery group mean was
higher than the control group mean.
The groups were not significantly different on any of the items
that probe preoccupation with eating and drinking and confidence of
ability to resist using.

Although the recovery group means were higher

for both types of preoccupation, lower for confidence in ability to
resist using, these differences were not significant.
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Description of Estimates
Subjects' estimates of their actual relative frequencies were
recorded on the Memory Task form.
subject rejected the task.

No estimates were missing, and no

For all subjects, each item tallied to the

100% total required by the task, indicating that the subjects understood
at least this part of the task and could correctly make calculations
required to ensure the 100% total.
The means and standard deviations of the subjects' estimates of
their actual relative frequencies by group and by item appear in Table
2.

Collectively, these variables will be referred to as estimates.

Inspection of a bivariate x-y scatterplot of estimates revealed that
subjects tended to frame their estimates in rounded numbers; that is,
in terms of multiples of 5 and 10.

Descriptive univariate comparisons

by means of two-tailed t tests resulted in the significant differences
reported in Table 2.

The recovery group made significantly higher

estimates on all the negative items.

No significant differences were

found between groups on the positive items.

Only one neither category

difference reached significance (proud-ashamed), with the control group
subjects estimating themselves as higher than recovery subjects.

Of

the remaining four daily responses, only one difference proved to be
significant, such that the recovery group subjects' estimates were
significantly higher on preoccu. using.
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Table 2
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group

Item

Group

Positives

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers
Alert/Drowsy

Controls

Recovery

M

SD

M

SD

69.2
67.6
48.2
58.5
33.0
62.6
70.6
64.1
71.6
58.1

24.0
31.2
36.2
32.4
35.0
29.9
29.3
33.09
31.3
33.4

69.7
62.6
54.3
62.1
52.6
59.1
61.5
53.0
63.9
45.8

25.6
29.8
31.5
27.2
36.2
29.7
28.7
29.4
30.3
33.8

Controls

7. 1
Happy/Sad
22.6
Irritable/Cheerful 22.5
Strong/Weak
38.5
Angry/Friendly
21.0
Active/Passive
22.8
Lonely I Sociable
22.0
Proud/Ashamed
61.8
Confused/Clear
24.2
Tense/Relaxed
20.7

9.8
30.8
28.0
37.4
28.7
33.7
29.8
38.2
29.5
19.8

Recovery

17.7
21.2
18.7
26.7
17 .1
17.3
18.9
34.5
15 .1
41.3

23 .1
28.7
22.7
33.5
22.9
23.8
29.1
37.4
18.7
32.0

P Level

P Level

*
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Table 2 - Continued
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group

Item

Group
Controls

Negatives

Angry
Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
Drowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

NOTE:

n

= 22

• p

M

SD

M

8.5
14.9
13.9
8.4
20.7

7.9
15.5
18.4
11. 5
19.8
19.6
10.3
14.2
16.9
4.7

23.5
22.2
27.6
21.0

SD
25.4
25.2
25.0
22.4

41.3
16.3
16. 1
19.0
20.6
12.8

32.0
19.2
18.3
16.3
19 .1
18.5

23.5
9.6
13.4
18. 7
2.5

Non-Mood Items

Controls
M
10.2
2.5
62.1
26.8

SD
16.2
4.5
47.8
26.4

for all group means •

< .05.

Recovery

Recovery
M
20.2
16.8
61.0
43 .1

SD
30.0
27.5
41.8
31.9

P Level

tt

tt

*
*

*
P Level

*
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Measures of Accuracy
Before describing individual measures of accuracy, the concept
of accuracy will be explored more specifically so that different
operational definitions can be viewed from their respective
underpinnings.

The literature on memory for frequency of occurrences

describes two types of accuracy:
accuracy.

absolute accuracy and relative

Absolute accuracy measures how much a subject's estimates

differ from the actual frequency of occurrence.

In the present study,

difference score measures reflect this kind of accuracy.

Relative

accuracy measures how well a subject can distinguish higher rates of
occurrence from lower rates of occurrence.

The present study uses

correlational measures to assess relative accuracy.

Other measures of

relative accuracy, such as rank ordering of targets for frequency, are
sometimes used in studies of memory for frequency of occurrence, but
were not used in the present study.

Measures of relative accuracy may

not agree with measures of absolute accuracy.

This is because consistent

underestimation or overestimation may still lead to high correlation of
actual frequency with estimates; that is, consistent distortions may
result in high discrimination between items on frequency of occurrence.
A measure that reflects absolute accuracy is the number of hits.
A hit is defined as success in reaching a specified (actual) range of
frequency.

Hit measures will be described at greater length below.

Measures can be developed that reflect both kinds of accuracy, for
example, when absolute differences between actual and estimated are used
to rank order the accuracy of judgments.
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To answer the question as to whether two individuals or groups of
individuals are more or less accurate in their estimates, both types of
accuracy described above must be considered.

In the present study,

several dependent measures were derived from frequencies and estimates.
These included hit measures, correlation measures and difference scores.
The definition of each measure, the kind of accuracy it reflects, and
its analysis are discussed under separate headings below.

Since there

are several variables that are used to measure accuracy, and the measures
may lead to conflicting findings, a brief review of the evidence for
between group differences on each type of measure will be made at the
end of each subheading.
Hit Scores
Hits were calculated using the differences between each frequency
and its estimate.

An estimate was clasified as a hit when the absolute

difference from its actual frequency was within a specified range.
Decreasing this range increases the level of accuracy needed to score a
hit.

An analogy to events at an archery range may help make the use of

the hit measure clear.

A subject making frequency judgments may be

compared to an archer attempting to accurately fire arrows at a target.
Individual judgments can be compared to individual trials at hitting
the bull's eye.

As the rings painted around the target's center help to

establish how close an arrow has come to the archer's goal, various
criteria for a hit within certain ranges of accuracy help to define how
accurately a subject has estimated actual rates of occurrence.
Hit measures reflect absolute accuracy rather than relative accuracy
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alone.

Since a hit can occur by chance alone (the chance rate of

occurrence depending on the absolute number that defines a hit, or the
width of a ring to follow the above analogy) the binomial test can be
used to determine if subject can achieve hits at a rate significantly
higher than chance.

By defining various criteria for a hit, each

requiring increased accuracy, a ceiling definition can be found, above
which subjects cannot achieve hits at a rate higher than that expected
by chance.
Results on the binomial tests cross groups and by groups for four
hit measures, defined by increasing levels of accuracy (plus or minus
10%, 5%, 2.5% and 1%), are reported in Table 3, along with the actual
number of trials (judgments) and successes (hits).

For subjects across

groups, hits occurred at a significantly higher rate than that expected
by chance, until a hit was defined as plus or minus 1%.

For the groups

taken separately, the ceiling above which hits could not be made above
the chance expectation was plus or minus 2.5% for each group.

The lower

ceiling definition for the groups taken separately is probably due to
the reduction in the number of trials.
It is likely that the probabilities assigned to chance occurrences
of hits in these binomial tests are in error, due to the fact that each
trial is not independent of other trials.

Whatever miscalculation that

may be involved, however, is probably consistent for both groups and for
all hit measures, and does not invalidate the rationale for looking for
a ceiling of accuracy, or group differences on such measures.

43

Table 3
Hit Measures by Group.

Definition
Range
Chance
Proability

+10

+2.5

+5
.2

•1

.05

+1.0
.02

Groups
Control Group
Total Hits

415**

263**

Mean Hits

18.9

12.0

Total Hits

383**

248**

Mean Hits

17 .4

11.3

1.0

798**

511**

322**

18. 1

11. 7

7.3

167
7.6

104
4.7

Recovery Group
155

89
4.0

Combined Groups
Total Hits
Mean Hits

Note: •• p < .01, binomial probability.

193
4.4
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! tests were conducted between groups for hits defined according
to the various criteria.

Since specific hypotheses were entertained

concerning hit measures; these! tests are to be considered hypothesis
testing in nature.

No two-tailed tests reached significance.

Under

the cognitive deficit hypothesis that recovery group subjects should
achieve fewer hits than control group subjects, one significant
difference was found when a hit was defined a plus or minus 2.5%, t
1.66 (42); Q < .05.

=

On each of the other three hit measures, the

recovery group showed a lower mean hit rate than did the control group,
although these differences did not reach significance.
Judging from the evidence from hit measures, which reflect absolute
accuracy, subjects in both groups can accurately estimate the rate of
occurrence of their mood states.

Some evidence was found for the

cognitive impairment hypothesis that recovery subjects would be less
accurate at the task than are control subjects; the one significant
difference required the use of a specific one-tailed hypothesis.
Difference Scores
Difference scores were derived by subtracting each estimate from
its corresponding frequency.

Both signed differences and absolute values

of differences were used to investigate group performance.

Table 4

presents the means and standard deviations of each signed difference
variable by group.

Table 5 presents the same information for the absolute

difference scores.

Although difference scores are dependent measures,

hypothesis testing by means of univariate tests were not conducted, due
to the large number of comparisons.

The t tests described here are to
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Table 4
Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Group

Item
Positives

Controls
M

Alert

0.4

Happy

-3.3
o. 72
-8.9
0.3
11.6
-12.1
-14.2
-10.1
-0.4

Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers

SD

M

SD

16.5
22.7
24.7
19 .6
20.7
18.6
21.8
23.5
22.1
19.6

9.7
1.2
1.2
-2.8
-3.2
-1.9
-3.0
-0.9
-0.3

21.0
18.6
18.6
19.9
17.7
18.6
18.2
20.8
17. 1
17.7

Controls

-2.6
Happy/Sad
2.2
Irritable/Cheerful
4.9
Strong/Weak
4.6
Angry I Friendly
9.8
Active/Passive
-0.3
Lonely/Sociable
10. 1
Proud/Ashamed
0.9
Confused/ Cl ear
2.7
Tense/Relaxed
-2.1
Alert/Drowsy

Recovery

9.4
23.7
17 .3
23.6
19.8
14.2
19.6
26 .8
22.0
24.7

o.o

Recovery

-14.6
-3.2
0 .1
-0.9
3.7
-3.8
-1.0
2.6
-0.3
-0 .1

21.8
19.5
17 .6
17.5
14.8
16.3
23.7
20.8
12. 7
13.6

P Level

P Level
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Table 4 - Continued
Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Item

Group
Controls

Negatives

M
2. 1
6.6
4.0

Angry
Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
Drowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

3.2
1. 7
2.4
1.3
2.6
9 .1
1.4

Non-Mood Items

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

NOTE:

n

= 22

• p

SD
6.7
12.9
13.6
11.8
16.5
15.0
10.5
9.8
12.3
4.0

Controls
M
-4.6
0 .1
32.4
-12.8

SD
15.4
5.8
51.6
25.9

for all group means •

< .05.

Recovery
M
-2.7
1. 7
2.3
0.6
0. 1
1.3
2.0

o.o
6.6
.06

SD
20.0
20.1
14.6
14. 1
21. 7
10.4
9. 1
14.2
16.4
12.4

Recovery
M

P Level

-12.9
-11. 7
27 .2

SD
25.4
22.6
40.0

-9.8

37.2

X Level

•
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Table 5
Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Group

Item
Positives

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers
Alert/Drowsy
Happy/Sad
Irritable/Cheerful
Strong/Weak
Angry/Friendly
Active/Passive
Lonely/Sociable
Proud/Ashamed
Confused/Clear
Tense/Relaxed

Controls

Recovery

M

SD

M

SD

13.0
18.0
17.8
14.7

9.7
13.5
18.31
15.5
13.5
13 .6
14.6

16.4
14.9
15.2
16.4

16.1

15.3
16.9
19.9
20.8
15.7
15.2

17 .5
18.3
11.8

Controls

6.0
18.8
14.6
17 .6
17.7
10.6
16.7
18.2
15.5
17.3

7.6
13.9
9.9
16.0
12.8
9.2
14. 1
19.2
15.5
17.3

13.8
14.0
13.8
16 .1
13 .5
14.4

10.7
10. 1
11 •0
11.2
12.0
11.8
12. 7
10. 1
9.8

Recovery

15.4
14.8
13.4
12.3
10 .1
10 .6
16.4

P Level

P Level

21.2
12.8
11.0
12.2

16.8

11.3
12.8
16.7
12.0

7.9
8.3

9.8
10.7

ti
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Table 5 - Continued
Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Group

Item
Controls

Negatives

SD
4.2

M

Angry
Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
Drowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

5.5
11.0

Non-Mood Items

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

NOTE:

n

= 22

• p

7.6
8.0
12.0
11 .o

9.2
11.9
9. 1
11. 1
10.2

7.8
7.5
10.6

6.9
6.7
11 • 0

2.3

3.5

Controls

M

13.0
13. 1
12.3
9.6
16.9
8.4
7.4
10.9
15. 1
9.4

SD
15. 1
15.0
7.6
10. 1

SD

M

7.9
2.9
40.2
20.6

13.9
5.0
45.5
19.9

14.3
12.5
28.2
27.0

P Level

*

13.0
6 .1
5.5
8.7
8.7
7.7

Recovery

M

for all group means •

< .05.

Recovery

SD
24.5
22.2
39.4
26.8

tr

.f Level
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be viewed as descriptive in nature. The

.!:. tests comparing the groups on

difference scored yielded the signficant differences reported in Tables
4 and 5.

Figures 2, 3, and 4 were developed to show the relationship among
frequencies, estimates, absolute differences and signed differences.
The plots are organized by the evaluative content of
f5 t_\it·~

repr·e~.er.tf:'

tli!-!

1i100G item~,.

FaC'h

1G mood items along a single evaluative

dimension: positive, negative, or neither.

Bars represent mean

frequency by group. Unconnected large dots represent mean estimates by
group.

Lines plot the level of absolute differences by group for each

variable.

Frequencies and estimates are plotted on the outer scale of

the figures, which range from 0 to 100 percent.

Hean signed differences

are reflected in the distance from the end of a bar (mean frequency)
and the unconnected dot (mean estimate) for each group.

An estimate

dot appearing above a group frequency bar indicates that the group on
the average overestimated the frequency of that item, and had a
negative mean signed difference.

An estimate dot in a bar indicates

underestimation, and a positive mean signed difference.
These figures demonstrate that both groups tend to overestimate
positives (Figure 2) and underestimate negatives (Figure 4).

Descriptive

.!:. tests of mean over·estimction ancl mean underestimation across all 10
items by evaluative direction, led to a trend toward significant
differences between groups on overestimation of positives, such that
the control group overestimated positive moods more than the recovery
group

(.!:. (42) = 1.82, p < .07). Other measures of underestimation or

Figure 2.
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Negative Hood Items
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overestimation did not approach significance.
Inspection of the levels of absolute differences across the three
figures shows that the recovery group is more acurate than the control
group on the positive scale and on the neither scale, but is less
accurate than the control group on the negative scale.

While both

groups exhibit extreme variations in mean absolute differences on
negatives, these changes are less pronounced on positives and neithers.
Also, the recovery group mean absolute difference is relatively stable
in elevation across the free figures, whereas the control group's mean
is very different in elevation on the figure for negatives than it is
on the other two figures.

The control group's accuracy, then, appears

more sensitive to evaluative direction that the recovery group's
accuracy, which is more stable across evaluative directions.
These relationships were further investigated by calculating each
individual's mean absolute accuracy for each evaluative direction, thus
creating three composite accuracy variables:

mean accuracy on positives,

mean accuracy on negatives, and mean accuracy on neithers.
Both groups had the same rank ordering of acuracy for the three
mean absolute accuracy measures.

In order of descending accuracy, this

rank ordering was most accurate on negatives, less accurate on neithers,
and least accurate on positives.

When t tests were conducted between

groups for each mean absolute accuracy measure, the only difference to
reach significance was that for negative items, with the control group
being significantly more accurate than the recovery group,
p < .04.

! (44) = 2.4,

The evidence, therefore, from these measures is that the control
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group is more accurate than the recovery group, but that this difference
surfaces only when the evaluative direction of items is considered (a t
test betwen groups on mean absolute accuracy across all three types of
item was not significant).
In summary, the evidence from difference scores points to an
interaction of group status, evaluative direction and accuracy.
subjects appear to be relatively invariant in their accuracy.

Recovery
Although

showing the same overestimation and underestimation effects that are
seen in the control group's scores, the recovery group's scores show
less systematic inaccuracy.

In fact, control group subjects overestimate

the occurrence of positive mood states significantly more than do
recovery subjects, making them less accurate as measured by absolute
differences on positive and mood items.

The control group, however,

shows higher accuracy on negative mood items.

The recovery group

subjects also show higher accuracy on negative mood items relative to
the other evaluative dimensions, but not as dramatically as do the
control subjects.
Discrimination Coefficients
A measure of accuracy of estimates sometimes used in studies of
memory for frequency of occurrences is the discrimination coefficient
(Flexer & Bower, 1975).

A correlation coefficient is calculated between

the subject's true and judged frequencies.

The result is a measure of

relative accuracy, rather than absolute accuracy, reflecting how well
subject responses distinguish one rate of frequency from another.

An r

to..;' transformation is necessary if the resulting correlations are not
normally distributed.

Since many of the discrimination coefficients

55

for subjects in the present study were in the high .90s and some
approached 1.0, transformations were made of all coefficients using the
Fisher.!: to..!' formula (Hays, 1973).
Overall discrimination coefficients.

Discrimination coefficients

based on frequencies and estimates for all 34 daily response items were
calculated.

Table 6 contains summary statistics for this measure by

group under the row for all.

Other measures in this table are

discrimination coefficients that have been computed on frequency and
estimate pairs other than all 34 judgments and will be described below.
Each measure is followed in Table 6 by the summary statistics for its
corresponding z' transformed scores.
Table 6
Discrimination Coefficients by Group.
Group
Controls

Pairs

H

All
All (.,!')

Positives
Positives (.,!')
Negatives
Negatives (.,!')
Neithers
Neithers (.,!')
Hood Only
Hood Only

(~' )

• 79
1.17
•72
1.10
.61
.99
•74
1.23
.83
1. 41

SD
.12
.39
.23
.59
.35
•78
.30
•71
• 15
.66

Recovery
M

SD

•78
1.19
.56

• 15
.49
.27
.41

•71
.62

.33
.62

.90
.48
.68
.80

.31
.61
.18

1.31

.59
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The discrimination coefficients for each group averaged in the high
.70s.

Neither the! test between groups on the original correlations,

nor on the .!.' transformations reached significance.

Across judgments

the two groups are very similar in their accuracy as measured by the
discrimination coefficients.

Since both groups were less accurate in

their estimates of the non-mood items than of the mood items, as reflected
in absolute differences discussed above, discrimination coefficients
were calculated based only on the 30 mood items.

The resulting

coefficients were higher, indicating higher accuracy, but the difference
between groups was still not significant.
Evaluative-content-based discrimination coefficients.

To

investigate the possibility that evaluative direction might be
interacting with group status and level of frequency to affect accuracy,
two additional discrimination coefficients were constructed:

one

reflecting accuracy on negative items only, and another reflecting
accuracy on positive items only.

The control group showed significantly

higher relative accuracy on positive items, ! (42)

= 2.53,

p < .02.

For negatives, however, the control group was slightly and nonsignificantly more accurate.
These differences again suggest a group by evaluative direction
interaction for accuracy.

The control group is significantly more

accurate on relative measures of accuracy on positives and neithers, but
the recovery group has more relative accuracy on negatives.

The reader

will recall that the situation was reversed for absolute accuracy.

The

recovery group had higher absolute accuracy on positives and neithers
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as measured by mean absolute difference scores, while the control group
had significantly higher absolute accuracy on negatives.

Together,

these measures of accuracy suggest that although both groups
systematically overestimated positives and underestimated negatives
(resulting in lowered absolute accuracy), the control group was
generally more accurate when both types of accuracy were taken into
consideration.
In review of the findings on discrimination coefficients, it is
clear that both groups show high relative accuracy when accuracy across
all items on the Memory Task are considered.

This overall accuracy

improves if only the mood items are used to assess accuracy.

Group

differences on overall measures of accuracy were not significant.

When

discrimination coefficients were constructed on single evaluative
dimensions, however, clear group differences did emerge.

The control

group showed significantly higher accuracy on both the neither items
and the positive items.
Spatial and Evaluative Category Judgments
The description and analysis of variables related to the General
Questions Section of the Memory Task are discussed separately in this
section because they are different in kind than the other 34 judgments
made by each subject.

All of the judgments in the present study are in

a sense category judgments:

they all required the subject to sum

frequencies over response ranges on the Daily Activity Reports.

The

judgments discussed in this section, however, require summing frequencies
not only across response ranges, but across mood items, using categories
not previously introduced explicitly to the subject in the context study.
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For example, in order to estimate the percent of responses that occurred
on the extreme right-hand side of the Daily Activity Reports, the
subject must use information for all 10 mood items.

In addition, the

subjects were never asked to attend specifically to the right-left
placement of their responses.

This judgment, then, requires the

subject to sum across items and to judge the frequency of implicit
events, such as right-left placement.
Four categories that were not explicitly introduced in the context
study were introduced in the General Questions Section of the Memory
Task.

The first two questions requested judgments of the frequency of

markings made by the subject on each spatial extreme ror all mood items.
The second two questions requested judgments of the frequency of
markings in the categories of positive and negative described to the
subject at the time of the administration of the Memory Task.

The

spatial category judgments were hypothesized to be less difficult than
the evaluative category judgments.

Group differences were hypothesized

to be more likely to emerge on the evaluative category judgments.
Description of relative frequencies.

The relative frequencies for

the first two questions dealing with extreme left and right placement
of responses were expressed as percentages of extreme left-hand (left)
and extreme right-hand (right) responses of the total of all mood item
responses.

The relative frequencies for the second two questions dealing

with evaluative direction of responses were calculated by taking the
mean of each subject's relative frequencies for positive items (good)
and the mean of each subject's relative frequencies for negative items
(bad).

The means and standard deviations for these variables and the
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resulting difference scores appear in Table 7, below.
Table 7
Spatial and Evaluative Category Judgment Variables
Group

Variable
Controls
SD
M
Frequencies
Right
Left
Good
Bad
Estimates
Right
Left
Good
Bad
Signed Differences
Right
Left
Good
Bad
Absolute Differences
Right
Left
Good
Bad

Recovery
M
SD

6.9
6.7
53.8
16.8

11.5
10.6

13.2
14.6
66 .1
23.6

12.3
12.9
18.0
14.2

31.5

-6.5
-7 .8
-12.3
-6.8

9 .1
9.0
22.1
12. 7

-9 .1
-14.3
-2.9
-8.2

14.7

7.5
8.6
1.5
11.4

8.3
8.1
16.9
8.6

12 .1
15.0
13.2
13.4

12.2

19.4
8.2

9.5
7.5
58.4

9.8
8.9
16.6

23.3

13.5

16.6

15.4

23.9
61.4

23.7
22.5
17.1

17.9
15.7
13 .9

17.2
8.7
8.8
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Description of estimates.

Subject responses to questions 1

through 4 in the General Questions were used without coding or
transformation.

The means and standard devisions of these variables

are included in Table 7.

Two-tailed t tests between groups on these

variables yielded no significant differences.
Dependent measures: difference scores.

Discrimination

coefficients for individual subjects were not used due to the small
number of judgments involved.

Hit measures were not developed due to

the small number of trials making the binomial test unsuitable for
reaching any conclusions about relative performance.

Instead,

difference scores were used to assess accuracy.
Difference scores on category judgments were computed by
subtracting the frequency from the estimate for each judgment.

The

absolute value of each difference was used as a separate variable.
Means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in Table

7.

None of the group differences were significant using two-tailed t

tests at the .05 confidence level.
Both groups overestimated frequency on all four questions.

This

may be related to the absence of any constraint on these judgments;
that is, unlike any of the other judgments for the present study, the
judgments in the General Questions Section are not directly linked to
other judgments. Even taken in pairs of spatial and evaluative judgments,
they do not have to (and probably should not) tally to 100%.

The groups

were very similar in accuracy with the only trend toward a significant
difference being revealed in a summed score for absolute accuracy on
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spatial judgments (combined accuracy on qustions 1 and 2),
1.84, .£

= .074,

!.

(42)

=

with the control group being more accurate.

When t tests for correlated means were performed between each
group's accuracy score on spatial judgments and the same group's
accuracy score on evaluative judgments, differences between these kinds
of judgments are suggested.

For the control group, significantly less

accuracy was displayed on evaluative judgments than on spatial judgments

(!.

(21)

= 2.39,

.£ < .03).

For the recovery group, however, there was

no significant difference in accuracy for these two types of judgments,
as measured by summed composite scores.
In summary, the evidence by means of difference scores on accuracy
of spatial and evaluative category judgments weakly supports the
hypothesized relationships.

There was a non-signficant trend toward

the control group being more accurate on spatial judgments.

The control

group was more accurate on spatial judgments than on evaluative
judgments as predicted, but this was not true of the recovery subjects.
Contrary to the hypothesis that group differences would emerge on
evaluative judgments, both groups performed relatively poorly on
evaluative category judgments; although the control group was more
accurate, this difference was not significant.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Different theoretical perspectives were used to generate the
hypotheses tested in the present study.

These hypotheses required

assumptions that at points directly contradict the assumptions of other
hypotheses.

Because of the absence of a unified theoretical perspective,

each hypothesis formulated in Chapter II will be discussed separately
in the present section.

Each specific hypothesis is presented

(sometimes in abreviated form) in bold type, followed by a discussion
of the related findings.

The second subsection below discusses the

results integratively across hypotheses, along with implications for
the different theories of memory for frequency of occurrences.

A

critique subsection follows, discussing the limitations of the present
study, as well as threats to its internal and external validity.

The

final subsection suggests directions for future research in the area of
memory for frequency of occurrences.
Specific Hypotheses
Automatic Processing Hypotheses
1.

Relative trequency estiaates and actual relative trequency ot

occurrence will be highly correlated.
this hypothesis.

Strong support was found for

Observed correlations were comparable to those

reported in other memory for frequency of occurrence studies.
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For some
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single evaluate dimensions, some subjects obtained correlations over
.99.

Hit measures and difference scores provided strong evidence for

high absolute accuracy, in addition to the high relative accuracy.
A possible alternative hypothesis that may lead to reservations
about interpreting this high correspondence of estimates to actual
frequency as support for automatic processing of Crequency information
is that it may, in part, be related to the 100% restraint on the
majority of the judgments.

Although it was demonstrated that the high

correlations between frequency and estimates were not solely due to the
requirement that most subjudgments tally to 100%, accuracy was generally
lower for items that consisted of two rather than three subitems (as
with the non-mood items), and lower still for items that consisted of
one judgment per item (as with the General Questions).

A possible

interpretation of these declines in accuracy is that the items that
differ in number of subitems from the mood questions are also different
in content, format, and/or difficulty

or

judgment (as was specifically

hypothesized for the category judgments in the General Questions Section).
Alternative hypotheses for the declines in accuracy on items with
fewer subjudgments may help to clarify the nature of the various judgment
strategies that may be available to subjects performing the tasks in
this study, although they are less parsimonious and, therefore, less
convincing.

One such hypothesis is that the multiple subjudgments result

in increased accuracy through improved guessing on the remaining
subitems, after subitems for which the subject had better frequency
information had first been performed.

This is possible because the
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subject was allowed to determine the order of subjudgments, although
not the order of items.

The first subjudgments made by a subject on an

item, if accurate, would reduce the amount of error possible in the
remaining two judgments, at least in the case of the mood items.

If

the remaining two subitems are merely guessed at (with the remaining
percentage points distributed randomly between them), higher accuracy
across the entire item would result than would be the case if these
items had been guessed at independently.

Another possible strategy that

uses information on one subitem to improve accuracy on others would
consist of performing the second and third judgments on a mood item
(and even, perhaps, the first) as a rank orderly task, by distributing
more of the remaining percentage points to the subitem thought to be
more frequent.
A strategy of using subitem information for subsequent subitems is
constructable from an analogy to signal detection theory and related
theories of judgment (Helson, 1959).

A subjudgment for which some

frequency counter information is detected (a clear internal signal) might
be used as a perceptual anchor against which to compare and contrast
the subitems for which less frequency counter information is held (a
weaker internal signal).

This hypothesis assumes that the subjects have

a subjective perception of frequency counters, and that this perception
can be improved through the use of a standard input or perceptual anchor.
This improved performance through the use of perceptual anchor has been
demonstrated in other physical and social perception judgments, along
with contrast and assimilation effects similar to overestimation and

65

underestimation effects found in the present study (Brickman, Coates,

& Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Manis & Moore, 1978).
A way of interpreting the observed high correlations without
recourse to either automatic processing theory or the effects of
placing multiple subjudgments and restraints on the overall judgments,
can be derived from personality theory and theories of personality
testing.

Instead of using automatically encoded frequency information,

the subject may resort to a strategy that takes advantage of the selfgenerated and self-related nature of the target frequencies.

By

referring to his or her self-concept (beliefs, expectations, and
feelings about self), high correlations might be obtainable on the
tasks used in this study, without the subject resorting to what might
typically be called memory processes.

If it were assumed that the

subject was unaware of this strategy, while nonethless resorting to it,
the projective hypothesis of personality testing would be relevant to
the Memory Task data (Anastasi, 1982).

With or without the assumption

of awareness, such a strategy, would make the task more like the
personality trait inventory than a measure of memory processes.
A related possibility is that subjects weighed the subjective
probability of different distributions of percentages when several
subjudgments were required, using an implicit personality theory that
contained accurate information about what traits could be expected to
go together given a certain type of person, the self in the case of the
present study (Kelly, 1955).

The subject would be using both a self-

concept and an implicit personality theory (personally derived but with
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a high degree of consensus across persons within a given culture) to
estimate what the subject thought should have been recorded on Daily
Activity Reports, rather than memory for what was actually recorded.
It is conceivable that subjects might be able to provide highly
accurate estimates of another subject's frequency, given a concept of
the other person based on personal acquaintance or some other source of
information, such as merely being told that a person was or was not a
recovering alcoholic.
Given these reservations, it is nonetheless parsimonious to view
the high correlations of actual to estimated frequency found in the
present study as (qualified) evidence for the automaticity of the
encoding of frequency information.

The qualifications related to viewing

the results from the vantage point of personality theory are mitigated
when the possible role of automatically encoded frequency information
in the formation of concepts (including concepts of self and others)
is taken into consideration (Cantor & Mischel, 1979).
2.

Actual frequency of occurrence will produce the only significant

effect on estillates.

The omnibus null hypothesis for effects on memory

for frequency of occurrence was rejected for the present study.

The

prediction of no significant effects was rejected for both overall
measures of relative accuracy, and for measures of relative and absolute
accuracy across specific types of judgments.

The demonstrated effects

on accuracy included effects of the evaluative direction of judgments,
of extremity of responses by evaluative direction, and group interaction
effects.
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This pattern of results is what would have been expected of a
study investigating effortful processes, rather than automatic
processes, under Hasher and Zacks' framework.

Rather than leading to

the disconfirmation of the automatic processing hypothesis, its
proponents might argue, the present study is not a good test of the
hypothesis because the tasks used to measure memory required (or at
least encourage strategies that require) large amounts of effortful
processing.

These effortful processes include performance of

calculations, weighing of probabilities, and recall of crucial mood
exemplars.

It could be argued that the significant effects

demonstrated in the present study were related to these effortful
processes that are expected to vary with conditions.
The possibility of such an argument can be viewed as a major
criticism of the automatic processing theory.

As Green (1984) has

pointed out, perhaps no meaningful test of the theory is possible,
since it may not be feasible to devise meaningful, ecologically valid
tasks that function without effortful processes.

Given the support

found for the first automatic processing hypothesis above and the lack
of support for the second, it appears more parsimonious to acknowledge
some automaticity in the encoding of frequency of occurrence
information, without endorsing the invariance of such encoding as is
advocated by Hasher and Zacks.
Cognitive Impairment Hypotheses

3.

The recovery group will have significantly lower accuracy

scores than the control group.

Discussion of this hypotheses requires
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clarification of the conflicting evidence from different measures of
accuracy.

On overall measures of absolute accuracy (hits) and relative

accuracy (overall discrimination coefficients) the recovery group had
consistently lower mean accuracy.

The only overall measure on which

this difference was significant was for a hit measure with success
defined as the estimate being within 2.5 points of the actual frequency.
The significant difference depended on the one-tailed prediction of this
hypothesis.
When accuracy for mood items grouped by evaluative connotation was
investigated, ambiguous findings resulted.

Because of different degrees

of overestimation of positive items and underestimation of negative
items, whenever one group had a higher absolute accuracy the other group
had the higher relative accuracy and vice versa.

The recovery group's

mean accuracy was at times higher than the control group's mean accuracy,
but this difference in favor of the recovery group was never significant.
On three measures of accuracy across evaluative dimensions (relative
accuracy for neithers, relative accuracy for positives, and composite
absolute accuracy for negatives) the control group was significantly
more accurate than the recovery group.

This significantly higher

accuracy for the control group is consistent with the cognitive
impairment hypothesis, and could be interpreted as evidence in support
of it.
These findings do not necessarily substantiate the cognitive
impairment hypothesis, however.

The finding that the groups differ in

level of accuracy by evaluative direction implicates factors other than
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chemically induced cognitive impairment (the assumption underlying the
hypothesis as framed in Chapter II).

A rival hypothesis that would

account for the lower accuracy of the recovery subjects and the
interaction of group status and evaluative direction on accuracy can be
framed by attributing the lower accuracy to the effects of depression.
This alternative hypothesis will be pursued further in the integrative
discussion, since it is relevant to most of the hypotheses entertained
in the present study.

For the discussion of this specific hypothesis,

the alternative hypothesis that the two groups differ on level of
depression points out the possibility of other variables (correlated
with group status but not identical with alcoholism status) which may
account for group differences.

Some of the control subjects may

themselves be undiagnosed alcholics.

The groups may differ in gender,

age, personal adjustment, motivation to participate, or other variables
that may be relevant to group differences on a cognitive task.

This

raises the issue of the internal validity of the present study to be
discussed in the critique subsection.
JI.

Group differences will be d•onstrated on evaluative category

judgaents, but not oD spatial category judgaents.

Recovery subjects

will have significantly lower accuracy OD evaluative category
judgaents.

Evidence was found to support the implication that spatial

category judgments are less sensitive to group differences than are
evaluative category judgments, and therefore may be less sensitive to
cognitive deficits.

Each group obtained the highest accuracy scores

on a spatial category judgment.

For one group, the controls, the
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difference between accuracy on spatial items and accuracy on evaluative
items was found to be statistically significant.
The main thrust of the above hypothesis, that recovery subjects
would not perform as well as control subjects on evaluative judgments
(presumably due to less cognitive capacity to perform the task) was
clearly not supported.

The control group was significantly less accurate

on the evaluative judgments than the recovery group.

This finding

(although consistent with the trend for the control group's accuracy
scores to be more sensitive to evaluative content) is inconsistent with
viewing the differences between the two kinds of category tasks as
related to task difficulty, while also hypothesizing higher cognitive
functioning for the control group.

The fact that the highest accuracy

score for both groups was on a spatial judgment may not indicate any
greater task difficulty for the evaluative judgments as cognitive tasks,
but may instead reflect lowered accuracy on evaluative judgments due to
underestimation and overestimation effects.

These effects may themselves

result from different response sets or availability heuristics for each
group.

Such response sets or heuristics would not be expected to

significantly interfere with spatial category judgments.
Availability Heuristic Hypothesis
5.

'!he groups will cliffer in the degree of underestiaation and

overestillation of items that should be aore salient or relevant to
recovering alcoholics.

Items were not empirically determined to be

abuser-relevant or more or less salient to alcoholics prior to the
present study, due to limited resources.

The basic thrust of this
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hypothesis, that groups would different in underestimation and
overestimation of items, depending on the content of the items, can
nonetheless still be tested.
For the non-mood items, which intuitively would seem more salient
and relevant to alcholics, both groups showed less accuracy than on the
mood items.

The small number of these items and the absence of

consistent group differences across them makes interpreting them as a
group of variables unpromising.

In fact, one might expect the subjects

in the two groups to have used the scales of these items differently,
while using the scales of mood items in a more similar way.

This

possibility will be further elaborated in the critique of the present
study, since it raises the issue of whether any of the self-reports or
subject estimates are truly comparable across groups.

This is another

threat to the internal validity of the present study.
The mood items, however, are larger in number and do show consistent
differences in accuracy.

It was found that positive events were more

related to accuracy for control group subjects than for recovery group
subjects.

Although both groups underestimated negative moods and

underestimated positive mood states, control subjects made significantly
higher overestimates of positive moods than recovery subjects.

The

difference between the groups on underestimation of negative moods was
not significant.

These findings suggest that it is the salience of items

to control subjects that accounts for significant group differences,
with the recovery subjects relatively less responsive to the content of
items.

The pattern of findings in the present study suggests that the

positive items were more salient and memorable to the control subjects
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than to the recovery subjects.

No corresponding type of item more

salient to recovery subjects (as established by a stronger effect on
their estimates) was demonstrated on the mood items.
Two alternative hypotheses not directly related to alcoholism or
recovery status can be suggested to account for the differences in
patterns of overestimation and underestimation of items depending on
their evaluative content.

The first hypothesis is that the groups

differ in the mean level of depression, a variable known to affect
judgments of items with evaluative, emotional, and self-referential
content (Bowers, 1981; Curt, 1981; Nelson & Craighead, 1977).

The

second hypothesis is that the groups differ in response set, possibly
due to different demand characteristics for the two groups.

The

personal significance and social context of the testing situation may
have been very different for the two groups.

Demand characteristics

may have functioned to influence control group estimates in the
direction of presenting a favorable image of themselves to the
researchers both in the Daily Activity Reports and the Memory Task.
The recovery group estimates, on the other hand, may have been
influenced in the direction of presenting an image of self to the
researchers that was consistent with the Alcholics Anonymous-oriented
treatment that they had received at the testing center.
Both of these alternative hypotheses will be further explored in
the integrative discussion, since they have implications for the
internal validity of the present study.
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Integrative Discussion
Several theories related to memory for frequency of occurrences
have been discussed as related to the individual hypotheses developed
from them.

Support was found for hypotheses under each theoretical

umbrella, while others under the same theoretical framework were not
confirmed.

For the automatic processing hypothesis, evidence was

found in favor of the automatic encoding of frequency information
without intention or effort, but the hypothesized invariance of such
encoding under differing conditions was rejected.

The cognitive

impairment hypothesis that frequency judgment performance would be
negatively related to alcoholism was supported; but the hypothesis
implying that this negative relationship to performance would be more
dramatic on complex category frequency judgments was not supported.
The availability heuristic prediction that recovery subjects and
control subjects would differ in degree of underestimation and
overestimation depending on the content of items was supported.
The recovery group (as was hypothesized) was not the group which
showed the strongest effects that might be interpreted as related
to salience or relevancy of items (item content effects).
Although the various theories have contradictory assumptions, a
unified perspective is possible that accommodates all of them in an
attempt to explain the findings of the present study.

The remaining

portion of this subsection will use the findings of the present study
to outline what the principal elements of a more unified persepective
would include, and what aspects of the three theories reviewed here
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appear unsuited for an attempt to accommodate the three theories to the
present findings.
A more unified, eclectic perspective would hold that frequency
encoding is automatic, in that it does not require intention or demand
large amounts of cognitive capacity.

At some point in the response

system, however, it would have to be acknowledged that performances
based on frequency information become vulnerable to the same influences
that affect effortful processes.

Whether this stage of vulnerability

is at retrieval of encoded information or at the time or encoding may
not be empirically determinable.
Recovering alcoholics show less accuracy than controls on
judgments of frequency, but these lowered performances may be interpreted
as related to a combination of factors, some directly related to the
neurological effects of substance abuse, and others not related to
chemically-induced brain dysfunction.

The lowered performances may be

related to aspects of cognitive set, such as self-concept, selfpresentation related to demand characteristics, and personal constructs
of the alcoholic.

Affective sources of lowered performance could lead

to both lowered capacity (as in depression or anxiety) and to systematic
distortions related to differential availability of mood states.
Accommodation to higher levels of emotional extremes might result in
anchoring points different from control subjects, creating another
source of group differences.

Finally, some subtle neurological deficits

may correlate with alcoholism but be causally orthogonal to any chemicallyinduced damage.

Hypothetically speaking, this could occur, for instance,
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in the case where a genetic factor leads to both suceptibility to
addiction and subtle neuropsychological abnormalities.
Depression has been suggested at several junctures in the
discussion of specific hypotheses as a variable that might account for
many of the group differences reported here.

The hypothesis that the

two groups differ on main level of depression would be consistent with
all of the theories entertained here, with the exception of the criteria
of invariance across experimental conditions, which is part of Hasher
and Zacks' automatic processing theory.

The hypothesis based on this

criteria was rejected in the present study.

Nonetheless, automatic

processing has much to add to an understanding of the ability of humans
to judge frequencies of ev.ents.

It is suggested that any unified

perspective on the encoding of frequency information not include this
criteria for automaticity, as originally formulated, but should instead
view this criteria as a statement of relative invariance.

In its

present form it is either not true, given the results of the present
study, or not amenable to a meaningful test, in that all significant
human performances to some degree involve effortful processes.
Although depression and its effects on memory for frequency of
occurrences was not the original focus of this study, and a full
discussion of the influence of depression on the findings reported here
are beyond the scope of the present discussion, a brief review of factors
that implicate depression as a relevant variable is in order.

A review

of the literature focusing on the differences between studies of the
automaticity of frequency encoding and studies of the effects of
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depression on memory has described the two kinds of studies as
differing in stimuli, type of judgment and measure of accuracy (Curt,
1981).

Depression studies were typified as using emotionally charged

materials, requiring category judgments of the subject, and using
absolute measures of accuracy.

Frequency studies were typified as

using innocuous materials, requiring item frequency judgments of the
subjects and using relative measures of accuracy.

Both types of

studies used some measure of depression as a variable.
The present study, in terms of its materials, methods, and
subjects, is well suited to demonstrate the effects of a depressive
memory on frequency of occurrence, if such effects exist.

It combines

all aspects of both types of study described by Curt (1981), except
perhaps truly innocuous stimuli, since all the stimuli for the present
study were self-relevant and therefore could be assumed to carry some
emotional significance for the subject.
measure of depression.

What is not present is some

If, however, the level of frequency for

negative mood items can be interpreted as a rough index of depression,
it could be argued that the recovery group and the control group are,
in fact, a higher depression group and lower depression group,
respectively.

The higher incidence of depression in a group of

recovering alcholics is consistent with reports in the clinical
literature.

The high incidence of depression among alcoholics bas been

a cornerstone of some theoretical and treatment approaches to alcohol
addiction (Jones, 1968; 1971; Wikler, 1973; Woodruff, Guze, Clayton, &
Carr, 1973).
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It is probable that depressed and non-depressed persons are in
each group, with the recovery group having more depressed persons,
and/or more severely depressed persons.
as forming four groups:

The subjects could be described

depressed controls, non-depressed controls,

depressed recovery subjects, and non-depressed recovery subjects.

Six

groups could be formed with severity of depression as another grouping
factor.

The depressed individual in each group would be expected to

have generally lower accuracy of estimates, more reactivity to negative
mood items, and less reactivity to positive mood states, as reflected
in accuracy measures.

Such a situation would mask even stronger

underestimation and overestimation effects than those demonstrated in
the present study, which used only alcoholism as the grouping factor.
If depression is a variable relevant to group differences found
here, the question arises as to whether the depressed condition is a
state or trait depression.

Based on Bower's (1981) work on the effects

of mood on memory, one may speculate that perhaps temporary mood states
are influencing accuracy in the present study, in addition to any effects
of long-term mood or cognitive dispositions.

Bower used hypnosis and

reading of emotionally charged self-reference statements to induce happy
or sad mood states prior to a memory task.

He demonstrated that persons

so induced had better recall for material that was similar in evaluative
content to their mood state.

He has labeled this effect of better recall

of mood-congruent material a "mood-state-dependent memory" effect.
Salience of material that is similar in content to the induced mood has
also been demonstrated by Bower and associated workers, and labeled "the
mood congruity effect" (Bower, 1981).

Bower frames his work as an
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extension of the availability heuristic and defined both mood-statedependent memory effects and mood congruity effects as "automatic."
Such effects could be integrated into a unified perspective to aid
in the explanation of group differences in the present study.

If it

can be assumed that the mood state at the time of the testing would have
been a random sample of mood states from the same population as those
recorded on the Daily Activity Reports, there is a high probability that
the two groups differed naturally in mood state at the time of testing,
with the recovery subjects having, on the average, a more negative set of
moods than the control subjects.

This alone might account for different

degrees of overestimation and underestimation of mood item frequencies
observed between the two groups, if frequency judgments are vulnerable
to mood-state-dependent effects.
In addition the groups may have, inadvertently, received inductions
for different moods states at the time of the testing, by way of the
different testing and participation contexts for the two groups.

For

example, if the ending of participation was experienced by most subjects
as a positive event due to a sense of accomplishment, an awareness of
having been helpful, or due to the relief from being "on the beeper,"
control subjects may have been primed by this positive experience to
have a mood congruent with positive memories.

At the time of the

testing. the recovery group would be without an equivalent priming for
positive moods.

In fact, the recovery group subjects were often

scheduled for their interviews on evenings when their outpatient therapy
or other treatment activities were scheduled as well, as a matter of
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convenience.

The anticipated or residual moods related to these

activities could have induced mood priming of a different nature from
that which may have been experienced by the control group subjects.
A complete investigation of the possible influences of state or
trait depression on estimates of frequency of occurrences is clearly
beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Nevertheless, the

importance of integrating both cognitive and affective factors in an
approach to understanding memory processes is suggested by the findings
of the present study.

Both Bower (1981) and Hasher and Zacks (1984)

conclude influential articles in cognitive psychology by stressing the
importance of investigating cognitive processes in the light of
emotional and unconscious processes.

The discussion of the present

findings might best be concluded by echoing this call, by suggesting
that emotional and unconscious factors are relevant to an understanding
of memory for frequency of occurrences.
Critique of the Present Study
Although random sampling from the recovery subject pool and
stratified sampling of the community sample were used, the present
study, nonetheless, has all of the weaknesses and limitations of a
correlational design.

In the context of a correlational design, the

use of terms such as "effect," "interaction," or other terms
designating causal relationships, must be seen as tentative, in that
correlational designs cannot in themselves demonstrate causal
relationships.

They are relevant, however, to causal hypotheses, in

that they expose them to disconfirmation (Campbell & Stanley, 1966;
Kaz din, 1980) •
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Given this design limitation, other limitations are also present.
Several of these are related to the composition of the groups.

The

groups were not demonstrated to be homogeneous in respect to alcoholism
status.

A criterion for inclusion in the community sample was that they

had no history of treatment for substance abuse.

Given this criterion,

some use of psychotropic substances would probably be expected by
community sample subjects.

It is highly possible that some undiagnosed

substance abusers or recovered alcoholics served as community sample
subjects.

Conversely, the recovery group was not homogenous for simple

alcohol abuse; poly-drug abuse and eating disorders were also diagnosed
for some of these subjects, and may have been present without diagnosis
in others.

Personality disorders, mood disorders, and other kinds of

psychological pathology were also diagnosed in the pool of subjects from
which the recovery group subjects were drawn for the present study.
This is less problematic, however, and actually adds to the ecological
validity of the present study, since these disorders may be casually
related to some cases of substance abuse.
The groups were not shown to be equivalent on a large number of
variables that might influence performance on the Memory Task.

Age,

gender, personal adjustment, participation in psychotherapy, motivation
for participation in the context study, and education are a few of the
possible variables that were not controlled for by selection or by post
facto analysis in the present experiment.

Any one of these variables,

or interactions among them, may have accounted for the observed group
differences, rather than alcoholism status.
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In addition, self-selection factors were operative in the
formation of groups, in that community sample subjects were volunteers
recruited via public announcement.

Volunteers willing to agree to two

weeks of intensive participation in a relatively intrusive self-report
study may differ significantly from the typical person.
subjects were recent inpatients as well as volunteers.

Recovery
Persons will to

participate in another program in addition to outpatient therapy, and
A.A. activities, may differ from those who do not choose to do so.
Since all persons taking the Memory Task must have participated for at
least two weeks in the context study, differential drop out may have
also influenced group composition, since it is reasonable to assume that
the pressures for dropping out are not the same for recovering patients
as for members of the community sample.
Another hypothesis that threatens the internal validity of the
present study is that the two groups may have received different
treatments.

The groups may differ significantly in the motives for and

understandings of their participation in the context study.

The groups

may have also received different treatments in the form of different
testing contexts, and different experimenter biases at the time of
testing.

For example, researchers involved in the context study were

also involved in treatment situations.

Recovering subjects may have

seen their participation in the study as related to treatment despite
explicit denials of this by the researchers.
placebo effects.

This may have led to

Demand characteristics different from those of the

control subjects may have been established, such as a response set
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designed to please researchers, and through them, therapists.

The

recovery subjects may have been motivated to express attitudes toward
the treatment facility and the therapy received there through responses
on both the Daily Activity Reports and the Memory Task estimates.

Any

of these possibilities might result in group differences not essentially
related to alcoholism status.
Several threats to the validity of the present study are related
to experimenter effects.

The Memory Task was administered for both

groups by research assistants.

These assistants at times had previous

contacts with recovery subjects, while this was usually not the case
with the control group subjects.

At the time of testing, the recovery

subjects could anticipate another 10 weeks of contact with the
researchers.

The control group was ending contact with the program.

This difference in social context for the testing may have influenced
estimates.

As mentioned in the integrative discussion, mood priming

may have inadvertently occurred, resulting in different mood states or
intensified mood states that may have influenced each group's estimates
differently.
Another problem related to the administration of the Memory Task
is the fact that the assistants who administered the task were aware
that one hypothesis of the memory study involved lower performance for
the recovery subjects than for the control subjects.

A subtle bias may

have been introduced in the administration of the test.

Another possible

source of unconscious experimenter bias lies in the fact that all of
the data for the present study were coded by the primary researcher, who
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was obviously aware of each specific hypothesis.

The coding and

rounding of responses could have been influenced by a subtle bias.
The relative objectivity of the responses makes this source of bias
unlikely, however, because no rounding was performed on estimates or
measures of accuracy used in analyzes.
Another limitations of the present study is the lack of any
empirical foundation for the assumption that the two groups did not
differ in the use of the scales used to record experiences.

An

extreme

happy state may be experienced differently by different individuals.
The same mood state could be expressed differently by different
individuals on the Daily Activity Report.

These differences in

individual use of the scale may have resulted in significant group
differences.

This problem in the use of scales for rating mood states

may not be as relevant from the point of view of automatic processing
theory, since the actual extremity of a response should not have
influenced the ability to estimate the frequency of responses.

From

other theoretical approaches to memory for frequency of occurrences,
such as availability heuristics or Bower's mood congruence sub-theory
of availability, different uses of the scales between groups would
obscure actual levels of mood between groups, and would be a serious
confounding of variables.
Suggestions for Future Research
Studies of memory for frequency of occurrences that utilize the
self-relevant, self-generated, and evaluatively laden stimuli of the
type used in the present study may add to an understanding of the role
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of unconscious and emotional factors in the use of frequency information.
Empirical investigation of the use of the specific self-report scales
and of item salience by the relevant grouping variables would be an
important addition to the methods of the present study.
The addition of other grouping variables, such as depression,
defensiveness (denial of negative emotions or experiences, for example)
organicity, or personality disturbance, and early versus late recovery
from addiction, would add to an understanding of the effect of these
variables on frequency judgment performance.

The degree of confidence

in judgments, subject awareness of overestimation and underestimation
effects, motivation related effects, and subject reports of cognitive
strategies used in performing the tasks should be investigated.

In

addition to self-reports of cognitive strategies, the subject's relevant
behaviors, such as the order of subitem completion, could be recorded
and used as predictors of accuracy.

Intentional mood priming by

experimenters could be added to future designs, along with measures of
the subject's mood at arrival at the testing site.

In general, variables

of relevance to both affective and unconscious processes in addition to
variables related to cognitive capacity and cognitive strategy should
be investigated for their relationship to the ability to accurately
estimate frequencies of self-generated occurrences.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT
Time Filled Out:

Time Beeped:
As you were beeped •
What were you thinking about?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Where were you?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

What was the MAIN thing you were doing?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Not at

Somewhat

all

How much choice did you have in
selecting this activity?
Did you feel in control of your
activity?
How guilty did you feel?
How vulnerable did you feel?
How self-conscious were you?
How much were you concentrating?
How satisfied did you feel with
yourself?

Quite

Very

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
0

1

2

6

5

3

7

8

9

Describe your mood as you were beeped:
Very

Quite

Some

Neither

Some

Quite

Very

Alert

0

0

0

0

Drowsy

Happy

0

0

0

0

Sad

Irritable

0

0

0

0

Cheerful

Strong

0

0

0

0

Weak

Angry

0

0

0

0

Friendly

Active

0

0

0

0

Passive

Lonely

0

0

0

0

Sociable

Adequate

0

0

0

0

Inadequate

Free

0

0

0

0

Constrained

Excited

0

0

0

0

Bored

Proud

0

0

0

0

Ashamed

Confused

0

0

0

0

Clear

Tense

0

0

0

0

Relaxed

Fat

0

0

0

0

Thin
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Describe your physical state as you were beeped:
none

moderate

slight

severe

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

Hunger
Tired, slowed down
Aches & pains
At the time you were beeped:
Who were
you with?

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

(
(
(
(
(

alone
spouse
brother(s), sister(s)
friend(s): number
( ) male ( ) female

)
)
)
)
)

mother
father
strangers
coworkers
other(s)

---

Describe how you feel about one of the persons you were with:
(If alone and thinking about someone, describe feelings about that person.)

very

very

middle

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

Close to
Inferior to
Friendly Toward
In control of
Supported by
(Identify the person you are referring to:
Not at
all
How preoccupied were you with
eating?
How preoccupied were you with
drinking/using?
Do you feel your eating has
been out of control since
last report?
How confident did you feel that
you could resist the urge to
binge eat?
Did you share your feelings
with someone close to you?

Distant from
Superior to
Angry with
Control! ed by
Rejected by
.)

Somewhat

Quite

Very

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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Indicate your alcohol intake since the last report:
Beer
No. of
Units

Liquor

Wine
()oz.

Per Unit

cans (12oz.)
cans ( 16 oz.)
bottles (12 oz.)
_ _ glasses (10 oz.)

No. of
Units

No. Of
Units

Oz.

Per Unit

()oz.

Per Unit

_ _ glasses (10 oz.)

shots (1-1/2 oz.)

fifths (26 oz.)
_ _ quarts (32 oz.)

drinks (1-1/2 oz.)
_ _ pints ( 16 oz.)

liters (33-1/2 oz.)

fifths (26 oz.)
_ _ quarts (32 oz.)

Indicate your drug use (what and how much) since the last report:
Indicate your foot intake since the last report:
Type

Quantity

No.
Binges __

No.
Binges __

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Great thoughts, Day dreams, Nasty cracks, Cartoons and Jokes • • •

APPENDIX B - MEMORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS
NOTE: Use this answer sheet and a blank booklet to get the person oriented
to the task.
KEY POINTS:
1. Want to get the subject to
booklet, not how they felt
may use their recollection
to how they filled out the

think about how he/she filled out the
then or now about the items. Many subjects
of feelings to "jog" their memories as
book.

2. These responses are in terms of percentages of 100%.

3. After you explain the task, see if they can tell you what they are
going to be doing.
4. "General Explanation": We are trying to understand how people
remember and what ways people may or may not use to remember things.
What we'd like you to do is help us in the memory test. There are
no right or wrong answers. All we will ask you to do is remember
some aspects of what you have been doing in regards to the patient
workbook.
We are going to concentrate on trying to find out how you filled
out ("marked") the book; not how you were feeling. This memory
task is only related to how you filled out the qustions.
5. Under the heading of General Questions:
The first two (#1 and #2) refer to a special dimension of memory.
All these questions are getting at is how often the mark was to
the right or left of the page.
Question #2 and #3 are related to the positive and/or negative
dimension of the item. This is the emotional/feeling aspect of
the task.
Help the subjects understand these two related, but by very
distinct tasks. Repeat it or have them repeat it before they do
the task. You can refer to the mood rating scale on the page
itself or to the unanswered page in the booklet.
6. When the subject actually gets to the mood items that are scaled
like the booklet, make it clear that the
(brackets)
over the various responses are calling for a summary of those marks.
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The total repsonse should equal 100%. They can answer the questions
any way they choose (e.g., figuring out j positive, then neutral,
and then negative or whatever sequence they choose).
7. The final four questions ask for two ratings that cut across these
dimensions. Again, these are summaries of their marks and the total
has to equal 100%.
Refer to the blank booklet to orient subject, if necessary.

8. Some subjects, when given the instructions, will feel it is impossible
to do. Encourage them, provide extra time, suggest that whatever
they can do will be helpful.
If subject persists, then excuse him/her from the task.
SCHEDULE OF SUBJECTS
1.

Presently Active Subjects
Gp I

Book 6

Overall Assessment

Gp II
2.

3.

Overall Assessment

New Subjects as of 5/21/84
Gp I

Book 1

Book 6

Overall Assessment

Gp II

Book 1

x

Overall Assessment

Community Sample
Book 1

These forms will be located in a folder in Lil's desk (marked "Memory
Study") and will be in the appropriate folders when subjects return.
A red dot will remind you that the task needs to be done on a given
subject.
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